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Mixing Oil and Water:
The Government's Mistaken Use of the
Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in
False Claims Act Prosecutions
Robert Salcido*
INTRODUCTION
One of the more interesting events in 1996 was the develop-
ment of a split in authority regarding whether the government
may base a False Claims Act ("FCA")1 action upon an alleged
violation of the provisions of the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kick-
back Act ("Anti-Kickback Act"),2 also referred to as the Anti-
Kickback Statute. The ultimate resolution of the conflict will
have a significant impact on the health care community.
The FCA and the Anti-Kickback Act are among the most
powerful weapons the government has in its arsenal to combat
health care fraud and abuse.3 The FCA is the government's
"primary litigative tool for combating fraud."4 It imposes liabil-
ity on those who, inter alia, "knowingly" present or cause to be
* Robert Salcido is an associate in the health industry practice group of Akin,
Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., in its Washington, D.C., office, where he con-
centrates his practice on health care fraud and abuse and health regulatory issues.
From 1988 to 1993, Mr. Salcido was a Trial Attorney with the Civil Division of the
United States Department of Justice, where he worked in the Department's Civil
Fraud Unit, focusing primarily on prosecuting actions under the False Claims Act,
including the Act's qui tam provisions, and handling cases arising under the Act's
voluntary disclosure provisions. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude
from Claremont McKenna College, and graduated from Harvard Law School.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 to 3733 (1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1995), as amended by the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996)
("HIPAA"). Compare United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914
F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss the FCA
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)), with United States ex rel. Thompson v. Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (granting defendants'
motion).
3. For an explanation of the sanctions that can be imposed for submitting false
Medicare and Medicaid claims, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and Medicaid
False Claims: Prohibitions and Sanctions, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 41 (1994).
4. United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 745 (9th Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS Act OF 1986, S.
REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266).
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presented "a false or fraudulent claim for payment."'5 "Know-
ingly" is defined to mean, among other things, that the person
acts in "deliberate ignorance" or in "reckless disregard" of the
truth or falsity of the information.
The FCA also allows for private enforcement. Under the
Act's qui tam provisions, private persons, known as "relators,"
may enforce the statute by filing a complaint, under seal, setting
forth allegations of fraud committed against the government.7
The government, while maintaining the complaint under seal,
investigates the allegations.8 The Department of Justice
("DOJ") can intervene in the action and lift the seal from the
complaint, thus assuming primary responsibility for prosecuting
the claim.9 If the government declines to intervene, the qui tam
plaintiff may elect, but is not obligated, to prosecute the action.10
If the government prevails on the merits, it is awarded treble
damages plus a $5000 to $10,000 penalty for each false claim
submitted to it; under most circumstances, the relator recovers
fifteen to twenty-five percent of the government's recovery (de-
pending upon the relator's contribution to the action), plus re-
imbursement of the relator's reasonable legal fees and
expenses." If the government does not intervene in the action,
the relator's statutory recovery is between twenty-five and thirty
percent of the government's recovery plus reimbursement of
reasonable legal fees and expenses.'2
The Anti-Kickback Act prohibits persons from paying or
soliciting remuneration in order to induce another to refer busi-
ness reimbursed under a federal health care program. The Anti-
Kickback Act is unlike the FCA in three significant ways: (1) it
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).
6. Id. § 3729(b).
7. Id. § 3730(b)(2). Qui tam "is an abbreviation for qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso, which means 'he who [is] as much for the king as for himself."'
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,647 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). For a discussion of the history and use of qui tam ac-
tions, see Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Histori-
cal Analysis of the Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act,
24 Pur. Corr. LJ. 237 (1995); David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act" An Old Weapon
with New Firepower Is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127 (1995).
8. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3).
9. Id. §§ 3730(b)(4) & (c)(1); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Babcock v. Dole Cit-
rus, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
11. Id. §§ 3729(a) & 3730(d)(1). Under section 3730(d)(1), if the relator's action
is based upon primarily public information, the relator's recovery is capped at 10%.
12. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
[Vol. 6
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Anti-Kickback and False Claims Acts
is a criminal statute, (2) it requires that the violator act in a
"knowing and willful" manner, and (3) it does not contain any
provisions that would permit a private individual to enforce its
provisions.13
The government's combined use of these statutes has proven
to be deadly when aimed against specific providers. The argu-
ment is that a claim for payment for services based upon an ille-
gally established referral is so tainted as to be a false claim. 14
Prior to 1996, the government's largest health care recoveries,
the 1994 National Medical Enterprises $324 million civil settle-
ment and the 1995 Caremark $161 million settlement, involved
allegations that these companies had violated the Anti-Kickback
Act and the FCA.15 In both cases, the government was con-
ducting both civil and criminal investigations. Each of these
cases settled before the DOJ filed an action, and there is noth-
ing to indicate whether the government would have alleged (1)
violations of each statute or (2) that the parties' alleged viola-
tion of the Anti-Kickback Act constituted a violation of the
FCA.
During the summer of 1996, any doubts regarding the DOJ's
intentions were resolved when it intervened in a qui tam action
alleging that the defendants violated the FCA because they had
engaged in practices in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act. In
United States ex rel. Parker v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc.,16
the government charged Apria with "submitting false Medicare
claims for patients whose referrals it received through a kick-
back scheme ....",1 The parties settled, and Apria agreed to (a)
pay $1.65 million and (b) enter into a four-year corporate integ-
rity agreement. Other defendants agreed to pay $346,000.18
In 1996, district courts split on the issue of whether an FCA
action based upon a violation of the Anti-Kickback Act may be
brought. 19 The resolution of this split is of tremendous signifi-
cance to the health care community, for if such actions are per-
mitted, the government and private persons will be able to avail
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2) (1995).
14. Ryan, supra note 7, at 146.
15. See Ronald H. Clark & Kendra L. Dimond, Compliance Plan: A Drug Com-
pany's First Line of Defense Against Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 13 FoOD DRUG
CosM. & MED. DEVICE L. DIG. 66 (May, 1996).
16. No. 1:95-CV-2142-FMH (N.D. Ga. amended complaint filed July 10, 1996).
17. DME Supplier, Three Providers Settle Fraud Charges for $2 Million, 8 BNA's
MEDICARE REP. 133 (Feb. 7, 1997).
18. Id.
19. See supra note 2.
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themselves of a civil statute (the FCA), which has produced
more than three billion dollars in recoveries over the last dec-
ade, in order to enforce a broadly worded criminal statute (the
Anti-Kickback Act). 20 The government has a strong interest in
persuading courts to permit such actions, as such actions would
(without the need for additional legislation) dilute the Anti-
Kickback Act's "knowing and willful" standard into the FCA's
"knowing" standard. In addition, if the government is successful
in the action, it can obtain not only treble damages, but the mas-
sive civil penalties offered by the FCA. Whistle blowers also
have an interest in combining the two statutes because the col-
lapse of the two into one transforms an action based upon a
statute that expressly does not permit a private right of action
(the Anti-Kickback Act) to one that permits a private person
not only to sue but also to become substantially enriched if the
action is successful (under the FCA).
However, as explained below, courts should reject the govern-
ment's and whistle blowers' requests to transform an action
under the Anti-Kickback Act into one under the FCA. Each
statute has a different standard of intent: It is possible for a
party to act recklessly without having the malice of willfulness.
In such a case, the two acts would conflict. When two acts con-
flict, the more specific, here the Anti-Kickback Act, governs.
Moreover, amendments to the Anti-Kickback Act manifest con-
gressional intent that the Act serve as the exclusive remedy
when it is alleged that an individual was improperly paid or im-
properly solicited remuneration in exchange for program-re-
lated business. Finally, an overly broad interpretation of the
Anti-Kickback Act will have a detrimental effect on beneficial
changes occurring in the health care community.
I. THE ANTI-KICKBACK Acr
The Anti-Kickback Act, in expansive language, prohibits any
type of payment, whether paid "directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind," that is knowingly and willfully in-
tended to induce someone to refer Medicare, Medicaid, or other
state health program patients, or to order goods or services re-
20. See Qui Tam Statistics, 64 FED. CoNT. REP. (BNA) 362 (Oct. 23, 1995). The
government has recovered more than $1 billion as a result of qui tam actions, which is
a subset of all FCA actions. One private group has estimated that the government
will recover more than $21 billion over the next 10 years (1996-2006) under the FCA.
See False Claims Act, 66 FED. CoNT. REP. (BNA) 229 (Sept. 16, 1996).
[Vol. 6
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imbursable under such programs.2' Specifically, the Act, among
other things, prohibits an individual from soliciting or receiving
any remuneration from any person (1) "in return for referring
an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,"
or (2) "in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging
for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program .... 22
Further, the Act prohibits an individual from offering or paying
any remuneration to any person to induce such person to make
these prohibited referrals or transactions.23 These offenses are
classified as a felony, punishable by fines of up to $25,000 and
imprisonment for up to five years.24
An understanding of the legislative development of the Anti-
Kickback Act is crucial in analyzing the relationship between it
and the FCA. It clearly demonstrates Congress's manifest in-
tent that the Act only operate against those who "knowingly
and willfully" engage in the proscribed conduct. Further, given
the all-encompassing nature of the Act's expansive language,
Congress intended that the executive branch promulgate spe-
cific guidance so that health care providers could plan confi-
dently and implement their commercial activities. The
legislative history is explained below.
A. The 1972 Legislation
Congress initially passed the Anti-Kickback Act in 1972. As
passed, the Act did not have a scienter (intent) requirement,
and, unlike its current version, it did not define activities that
were excluded from its statutory terms. Also, unlike the current
version, a violation of the original statute constituted a misde-
meanor, not a felony. Specifically, the Act prohibited one from
(a) "furnish[ing] items or services to an individual for which
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
22. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) & (B) (emphasis supplied). For purposes of this stat-
ute, a federal health care program includes state health care programs, such as pro-
grams funded or receiving state allotments under Titles V, XIX, or XX of the Social
Security Act, and "any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether di-
rectly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part,
by the United States Government (other than the [Federal Employees Health Benefit
Program]) .... Id. § 1320a-7b(f) (Supp. 1997).
23. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2) (1995).
24. Id.
1997]
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payment is or may be made under [federal law]," (b) soliciting,
offering, or receiving a "kickback or bribe in connection with
the furnishing of such items or services.. ," (c) paying or re-
ceiving such payment, or (d) soliciting, offering, or receiving a
"rebate of any fee or charge for referring any such individual to
another person for the furnishing of such items or services
.... ,,25 Conviction brought with it a fine of up to $10,000 and/or
imprisonment for up to one year.26
According to the House Ways and Means Committee Report,
the statute primarily was directed toward outlawing referral ac-
tivities that most professional organizations had considered to
be unethical and activities that led to the inappropriate use of
scarce federal funds. The committee felt that a "specific provi-
sion defining acts subject to penalty under the Medicare and
Medicaid programs should be included to provide penalties for
certain practices which have long been regarded by professional
organizations as unethical, as well as unlawful in some
jurisdictions." 27
25. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat.
1329, 1419 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1995)). The Medi-
caid Act contained a parallel provision. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396h(b)(1)).
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 92-231 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093. In
interpreting this version of the statute, circuit courts differed in how strictly they de-
fined the statutory terms. For example, the Second and Fifth circuits reversed convic-
tions on the grounds that the terms "bribe" and "kickback" encompassed conduct
requiring a breach of duty or law. See United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d
Cir. 1978) (ruling that where the nursing home accepted payments in exchange for
preferential admission, it did not violate the law because the conduct "did not in-
crease the cost to the government of patient care, decrease the quality of patient care
purchased by the government or involve the misapplication of government funds
.... "); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the
defendants' conviction because the court believed that their conduct could not fairly
be characterized as a bribe or kickback because it could not find any breach of "duty
imposed upon any of these defendants by a statute or regulation, the violation of
which would amount to a misapplication of federal funds"). The Seventh Circuit and
Sixth Circuit focused their review on the dictionary definition of the term "kickback"
rather than on whether defendants breached a known duty. See United States v. Han-
cock, 604 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 1979) ("The term [kickback] is commonly used
and understood to include 'a percentage payment ... for granting assistance by one in
a position to open up or control a source of income' ... and we think it was used in
the statute to include such a payment.") (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)); United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
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B. The 1977 Legislation
Congress broadened the Anti-Kickback Act in 1977. Rather
than prohibiting acts involving "bribes" or "kickbacks," it chose
to prohibit the payment of "remuneration" in exchange for re-
ferral. Further, it upgraded the penalty for a violation from a
misdemeanor to a felony. However, in order to foster commer-
cially beneficial transactions, it limited the broad application of
the statute by creating statutory exceptions regarding the pay-
ment of discounts and payments made pursuant to a bona fide
employment relationship.28 Specifically, the revised statute first
prohibited one from soliciting, offering, or receiving "any remu-
neration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind" in exchange for
referring an individual or arranging for the provision of any item
or service paid for in whole or in part with federal funds or in
exchange for actually participating in or recommending the
purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging of "any good, facility,
service, or item" paid for in whole or in part with federal
funds.29 One who violated the Act was guilty of a felony and
subject to up to $25,000 in fines and/or imprisoned for up to five
years. It also prohibited one from offering or paying remunera-
tion of the same sort in exchange for the same activities. 30 The
1977 Act did not apply to "a discount or other reduction in price
... if the reduction in price was properly disclosed and appropri-
ately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made" nor "any
amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona
fide employment relationship with such employer) for employ-
ment in the provision of covered items or services. ' '31
The legislative history underlying the amendment is sparse.
The House Ways and Means and the Interstate Commerce and
Foreign Commerce committees' report on the Medicare and
Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse amendments expressed three
primary purposes in amending the statute. The first was to en-
hance deterrence by upgrading the penalty.
Recent hearings and reports.. . indicate that such penalties
[the misdemeanor provisions of existing law] have not proved
adequate deterrents against illegal practices by some individu-
28. See Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-
142, § 4(a), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180-81 (1977). Congress used the same language quoted
above to revise the Medicaid Anti-Kickback Act. 91 Stat, at 1182.
29. Pub. L. No. 95-142 at § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. at 1180.
30. Id. § 4(b)(2), 91 Stat. at 1180.
31. Id. § 4(b)(3), 91 Stat. at 1181.
1997]
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als who provide services under Medicare and Medicaid. In ad-
dition, these misdemeanor penalties appear inconsistent with
existing Federal criminal code sanctions which make similar
actions punishable as felonies.32
The second purpose was to clarify ambiguous language.
[The amendment] would make subject to the penalty provi-
sions any person who solicits or receives any remuneration (1)
in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnish-
ing, or arranging for the furnishing of items or services; or (2)
in return for purchasing, leasing, or ordering, or arranging for,
or recommending the purchasing, leasing, or ordering of
goods, facilities, or services. Also, any person who offers or
pays any remuneration to any person to induce such person to
do similar activities would be subject to the penalty provisions.
The bill would define the term "any remuneration" broadly
to encompass kickbacks, bribes, or rebates which may be made
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind
(but would exclude any amount paid by an employer to an
employee for employment in the provision of covered items or
services).33
The amendment's third purpose was to identify activities that
would not fall within the scope of the statute because they were
good business practices resulting in program savings. For exam-
ple, among other things,
[t]he bill would specifically exclude the practice of discount-
ing or other reductions in price from the range of financial
transactions to be considered illegal under Medicare and
Medicaid, but only if such discounts are properly disclosed and
reflected in the cost for which reimbursement could be
claimed. The committee included this provision to ensure that
the practice of discounting in the normal course of business
transactions would not be deemed illegal. In fact, the commit-
tee would encourage providers to seek discounts as a good
business practice which results in savings to Medicare and
Medicaid program costs.3
C. The 1980 Amendments
In 1980, Congress amended the statute by including a mens
rea element, clarifying that only those who "knowingly and will-
fully" engage in a prohibited act will suffer penalties under the
32. See H.R. REP. No. 95-393, pt. 2, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3039, 3055.
33. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3056.
34. Id.
[Vol. 6
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statute.35 Specifically, the House Budget Committee Report
pointed out that the purpose of the revision was to ensure that
those whose conduct may have been improper would nonethe-
less not be prosecuted unless they specifically intended to en-
gage in the proscribed conduct.36 This same element exists
today.
D. The 1987 Amendments
In 1987, Congress again revised the statute to better define its
scope and application. Specifically, Congress created additional
statutory exceptions: one exception allowed the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to exclude through regulations any
payment practice, the so-called safe harbors, and another ex-
cluded the amounts paid by vendors to group purchasing organi-
zations in exchange for the organization arranging for the
purchase of items or services by those who furnish these health
care items or services.37 According to a Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report, the purpose of this provision was to address "un-
certainty among health care providers as to which commercial
arrangements are legitimate, and which are proscribed. ' 38 In or-
der to clarify the uncertainty, it commanded the "Secretary of
Health and Human Services ["HHS"], in consultation with the
Attorney General,... [to] promulgate final regulations, specify-
ing payment practices that shall not be treated as a criminal of-
fense under [the statute] ... and shall not serve as the basis for
an exclusion" from participation in Medicare or the state health
care programs under the Act.39
Furthermore, Congress amended the statute to create an ad-
ministrative procedure under which the Secretary could exclude
from the Medicare program persons who violated, among other
things, the Anti-Kickback Act. Although the exclusion would
initially be effected through an administrative proceeding, the
intent requirement remained unchanged. Prior to issuing any
exclusion, the Secretary had to afford the individual a hearing
35. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat.
2599, 2625 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1)(1995)).
36. H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526,
5572.
37. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-93, 99 4 & 14, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89, 697-98 (1987) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1995)).
38. S. REP. No. 100-109, at 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707-08.
39. Pub. L. No. 100-93, §14(a), 101 Stat. at 697-98.
1997]
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before an administrative law judge "because some of the
grounds for exclusion under [the Act] may involve practices that
require adjudication to determine whether the requisite criminal
intent existed to 'knowingly and willfully' violate the
standards." 40
E. The 1996 Amendments
Recently, Congress enacted the HIPAA, which contains pro-
visions bearing on the Anti-Kickback Act 1.4  Specifically, to pro-
vide clear guidance to the health care community and assure
that federal authorities would prosecute only those who deliber-
ately engaged in prohibited conduct, Congress has commanded
that the Secretary undertake three actions. First, the Secretary
must publish for comment and consider for final ruling any ap-
propriate modifications to existing safe harbors, as well as
promulgating additional safe harbor provisions.42 Second, the
Secretary must issue advisory opinions explaining the meaning
of remuneration, whether a transaction constitutes prohibited
remuneration under the statute or regulations, what constitutes
"an inducement to reduce or limit services" as prohibited by the
Act, and whether an activity is subject to sanctions. 3 Third, the
40. S. REP. 100-109, at 13, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 693.
41. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). For a detailed explanation of the
fraud provisions of HIPAA, see Colleen Faddick, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: New
Weapons, New Penalties, and New Fears for Providers Created by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 77
(1997).
42. Specifically the Act states:
After considering [the public] proposal[,] ... the Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall publish in the Federal Register proposed
modifications to existing safe harbors and proposed additional safe harbors,
if appropriate, with a 60-day comment period. After considering any public
comments received during this period, the Secretary shall issue final rules
modifying the existing safe harbors and establishing new safe harbors, as
appropriate.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 205 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a)(1)(B)).
43. Specifically the Act states:
(1) Issuance of Advisory Opinions
The Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall issue written
advisory opinions as provided in this subsection.
(2) Matters Subject to Advisory Opinions
The Secretary shall issue advisory opinions as to the following matters:
(A) What constitutes prohibited remuneration within the meaning of [the
Anti-Kickback Act].
(B) Whether an arrangement or proposed arrangement satisfies the criteria
set forth in [the Anti-Kickback Act] for activities which do not result in
prohibited remuneration.
10
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Inspector General must determine whether to issue special
fraud alerts upon receipt of a public request.44
The House Ways and Means Committee stated that the pur-
pose of these requirements was to ensure that existing law did
not have a chilling effect on legitimate business arrangements.
Congress believed that the Secretary's clarification of the statute
would enable prosecutors to spend their time on the more egre-
gious types of conduct. Congress reasoned that providers "want
to comply with the fraud and abuse statute, but many are unsure
of how the statute affects them [and they] should be able to re-
ceive guidance from the government. 45
Finally, Congress also created an exception to the Anti-Kick-
back Act to accommodate risk-sharing arrangements for provid-
ing services and items between a Medicare HMO or
Competitive Medical Plan,46 provided that the arrangement
"places the individual or entity at substantial financial risk for
the cost or utilization of the items or services... which the indi-
vidual or entity is obligated to provide. 47
F. Court Construction of the Intent Element
As noted previously, the Anti-Kickback Act requires that one
knowingly and willfully perform a prohibited act to be found
guilty of violating the statute. Circuit courts, however, have split
on the precise meaning of "knowingly and willfully."
(C) Whether an arrangement or proposed arrangement satisfies the criteria
which the Secretary has established, or shall establish by regulations for
activities which do not result in prohibited remuneration.
(D) What constitutes an inducement to reduce or limit services to individu-
als entitled to benefits ... within the meaning of [the Anti-Kickback Act].
(E) Whether any activity or proposed activity constitutes grounds for the
imposition of a sanction under [the exclusion, civil monetary penalties, or
criminal penalties provisions].
Id. § 205 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(2)).
44. The Act states:
Upon receipt of a [public] request ... , the Inspector General shall investi-
gate the subject matter of the request to determine whether a special fraud
alert should be issued [and] ... [i]f appropriate, ... issue a special fraud alert
in response to the request. All special fraud alerts issued pursuant to this
subparagraph shall be published in the Federal Register.
Id. § 205, 110 Stat. at 2003 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(c)(1)(B)).
45. H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 84-85 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865,
1884-85.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1995).
47. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 216, 110 Stat. at 2007.
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In Hanlester Network v. Shalala,48 the Office of the Inspector
General asserted that the Hanlester litigants had offered and
paid remuneration to physician-investors to induce referrals of
laboratory tests to the three laboratories owned by Hanlester
Network, in violation of section 1320a-7b(b)(2) of the United
States Code, and had solicited and received payments from
Smithkline BioScience Laboratories in exchange for referrals, in
violation of section 1320a-7b(b)(1). 49 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, ruling that the Act's "knowingly and willfully" standard
requires that persons (1) know that the statute "prohibits offer-
ing or paying remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage
in prohibited conduct with the specific intent to disobey the
law."' 50 In applying this standard, the court ruled that the liti-
gants had not knowingly and willfully paid or received payments
for referrals because, among other things, the partnerships had
not conditioned the purchase of shares on an agreement to or-
der tests, conditioned the number of shares sold on the amount
of business that the physicians agreed to refer, or authorized the
ouster of partners who failed to refer business. Further, the
partnerships did not believe that their arrangement contravened
the law. Similarly, the court found that the litigants had not
knowingly and willfully solicited and received remuneration in
return for referrals because the nature of the management serv-
ices agreements was common. They did not conceal their pay-
48. 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995). For an explanation of the implications of
Hanlester, see William R. Kucera, Jr., Note, Hanlester Network v. Shalala. A Model
Approach to the Medicare and Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 413
(1996).
49. 51 F.3d at 1394-95. The Hanlester litigants consisted of the Hanlester Network
(the general partnership), the Keorle Corporation (the name of the Hanlester Net-
work after its sale), Pacific Physicians Clinical Laboratory (a limited partnership of
the Network), Omni Physicians Clinical Laboratory, Ltd. (a limited partnership of the
Network), Placer Physicians Clinical Laboratory, Ltd. (a limited partnership of the
Network), Kevin Lewand (President of the Network), Gene Tasha (a general partner
in the Network and its Vice President of Operations), Melvin L. Hantsinger, M.D.
(the Network's Medical Director), and Ned Welsh (a general partner in the Network).
The limited partnership had entered into a laboratory management agreement with
Smithkline under which the partnerships would provide a medical director and pay
Smithkline a monthly management fee. This was the first time the government used
the Anti-Kickback Act to sanction a self-referral arrangement. Kucera, supra note 48,
at 452.
50. 51 F.3d at 1400. See generally Michael Tichon et al., Compliance Issues Under
the New Fraud and Abuse Rules, 16 WHrIT-ER L. REV. 1085, 1094 (1995) (Under the
Hanlester decision, "unless someone subjectively believes that at the time of his or her
conduct it was illegal, he or she did not violate the statute ....").
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ments to Smithkline, and they did not believe that their
arrangement was unlawful.5 '
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Jain52 reached a slightly
different conclusion regarding the required intent under the
Act. Dr. Jain and his corporation, Center for Mental Health
Services, Inc., were convicted of receiving payments from a psy-
chiatric hospital for referring patients to that hospital. TWo for-
mer hospital administrators testified against Dr. Jain, who
operated an outpatient therapy clinic, contending that he de-
manded payment from the hospital in exchange for his agree-
ment to refer patients. Dr. Jain testified that the payments he
received were for mental health workshops he provided; he de-
nied ever requesting money for referrals, which he agreed would
constitute "illegal," "unethical," and "wrong" conduct. 3
In construing the meaning of the intent standard, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the district court's jury instruction. The court
ruled that the "mens rea standard should only require proof that
Dr. Jain knew that his conduct was wrongful, rather than proof
that he knew it violated 'a known legal duty.'"' The Eighth
Circuit distinguished the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Hanlester, not-
ing that Hanlester "involved an administrative debarment
proceeding.'55
Whether subsequent courts follow the Ninth Circuit's formu-
lation requiring that defendants know that they breached a legal
duty or the Eighth Circuit's formulation requiring that defend-
ants know that their conduct was wrongful, the government
must prove, at a minimum, that defendants have "actual"
knowledge that the conduct at issue is improper.
51. 51 F.3d at 1400-01.
52. 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
53. Id. at 438-39.
54. Id. at 439. The court further held:
The parties assert radically different positions on this issue of statutory con-
struction. Based upon the traditional principle that ignorance of the law is
no defense, the government urges us to apply the general rule that "will-
fully" in a criminal statute "refers to consciousness of the act but not to con-
sciousness that the act is unlawful." Defendants urge us to adopt the
exception to that general rule that has long been applied in criminal tax
cases-willfulness in a criminal tax statute means the "voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty."
Id. at 440 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit also "instructed that 'good faith' was
a defense to this charge, explaining that Dr. Jain acted in good faith if he believed he
was being paid for promoting the hospital, and not for referring patients." Id.
55. Id. at 441.
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The legislative underpinnings of the Anti-Kickback Act
demonstrate Congress's manifest intent that the statute only be
applied against those persons who acted with a specific intent to
engage in prohibited conduct. As will be shown in the next sec-
tion, this is a substantially higher intent standard than the "con-
structive" knowledge standard of the False Claims Act.
Moreover, to the extent that Congress established an enforce-
ment mechanism, it established that the Anti-Kickback Act shall
be enforced through criminal prosecution or administrative ac-
tion. It did not create a civil cause of action, whether brought by
the government or a private individual.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS AcT
The False Claims Act, passed in 1863 to halt contractor
frauds against the Union Army during the Civil War, originally
prohibited the "present[ation of] ... any claim upon or against
the Govemment... knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent," and imposed both criminal and civil penalties. 6
The FCA prohibited the "knowing" submission of false claims,
but did not define the words "knowing" or "knowingly. '57 Be-
cause of the lack of a definition and the use of otherwise impre-
cise language, the circuits inconsistently interpreted the statute's
intent standard.58 The Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits
held that the FCA required proof that the defendant acted with
the intent to deceive the government.5 9 The Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth circuits and the Court of Claims held that an intent to
deceive was not necessarily a requisite element of proof.6° In
1986, Congress amended the statute to clarify that no "specific
56. Ryan, supra note 7, at 127-28. See also Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696
(emphasis added). In its current version, the word "fictitious" has been deleted.
57. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) (superseded).
58. Because of its origin as a statute providing criminal penalties, some courts
construed the provision to apply only to "fraudulent" conduct. Conversely, other
courts, noting the use of the disjunctive in the statute-false or fraudulent-ruled that
no specific intent to defraud was required and that the government need only prove
that the person knew the claim was "false." Under this interpretation, one could be
held liable under the statute without the government proving that the person had an
illicit intent.
59. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1509, 1512 (11th Cir. 1987).
60. See United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1978); Miller v.
United States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1977); United States v. Cooperative Grain and
Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 56 (8th Cir. 1973); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475,
479 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965).
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intent" is required to violate the statute.6 ' Instead, Congress
specified that those who act with "reckless disregard" or in "de-
liberate ignorance" of the facts can be held liable under the
Act.62
A. 1986 Revisions to the FCA
A study of the House and Senate committee reports analyzing
the 1986 amendments clarifies the statute's intent standard. On
June 26, 1986, the House Judiciary Committee issued a report
on its bill to amend the FCA.63 Acknowledging the problem in
interpreting the knowledge requirement, the House Judiciary
Committee described the parameters of the legislative amend-
ment. "There is no doubt that actual knowledge of a claim's
falsity will confer liability under the statute. However, courts
have in the past reached different opinions in defining what type
of 'constructive knowledge,' if any, will result in liability. '"64 The
House bill's definition of "knowing" and "knowingly" was al-
most identical to that actually passed. It required that the per-
son have "actual knowledge" of the information in the claim or
"deliberately choose to remain ignorant" of the truth or falsity
of the information, or act in "reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information. "65 The Committee further reported:
It is intended that persons who ignore "red flags" that the
information may not be accurate or those persons who deliber-
ately choose to remain ignorant of the process through which
their company handles a claim should be held liable under the
Act. This definition, therefore, enables the Government not
61. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6-7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5271-72:
As a civil remedy designed to make the Government whole for fraud losses,
the civil False Claims Act currently provides that the Government need only
prove that the defendant knowingly submitted a false claim. However, this
standard has been construed by some courts to require that the Government
prove the defendant had actual knowledge of fraud, and even to establish
that the defendant had specific intent to submit the false claim. . . The
Committee believes this standard is inappropriate in a civil remedy and pres-
ently prohibits the filing of many civil actions to recover taxpayer funds lost
to fraud.
62. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1995).
63. See 132 CONG. Rlc. H6474-88 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Glickman).
64. H.R. REP. 99-660, at 20 (1986).
65. Id Congress's sole amendment to this provision prior to passage was to affix
the phrase "and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required" at the conclusion of
the sentence that defined the statutory terms "knowing" and "knowingly."
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only to effectively prosecute those persons who have actual
knowledge, but also those who play "ostrich."'
Shortly after the House Judiciary Committee issued this re-
port, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued its report67 on the
Senate's bill to amend the FCA. While the Senate's definition
differed from that of the House, the Senate Judiciary Committee
similarly described the scope of the provision in expansive
terms.
[S]ome courts... require that the Government prove the
defendant had actual knowledge of fraud, and even to estab-
lish that the defendant had specific intent to submit the false
claim, for example, United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d
1003 (5th Cir. 1972). The Committee believes this standard is
inappropriate .... Currently, in judicial districts observing an
"actual knowledge" standard, the Government is unable to
hold responsible those corporate officers who insulate them-
selves from knowledge of false claims submitted by lower-level
subordinates. The "ostrich-like" conduct which can occur in
large corporations poses insurmountable difficulties for civil
false claims recoveries.
The Committee is firm in its intention that the act not pun-
ish honest mistakes or incorrect claims submitted through
mere negligence. But the Committee does believe the civil
False Claims Act should recognize that those doing business
with the Government have an obligation to make a limited in-
quiry to ensure the claims they submit are accurate.68
Later in its report, the Committee noted that the exact scope
of the person's "obligation" will differ depending upon the types
of claims that are submitted.
The Senate's version defined "this obligation as 'to make such
inquiry as would be reasonable and prudent to conduct under
the circumstances to ascertain the true and accurate basis of the
claim.' Only those who act in 'gross negligence' of this duty will
be found liable under the False Claims Act. 69
Prior to the introduction of the Senate's bill on the floor, the
committee changed the definition of "knowing" and "know-
66. Id. Later, while discussing the bill's scienter standard on the House floor, the
House's chief sponsor of the legislation, Representative Berman, pointed out that the
FCA should be viewed as imposing an "affirmative obligation" on persons to ascer-
tain the truthfulness of their claims. 132 CONG. RE C. H6474-88 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1986).
67. S. REP. No. 99-345, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266.
68. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271-72.
69. Id. at 20, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5285.
[Vol. 6
16
Annals of Health Law, V l. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol6/iss1/6
Anti-Kickback and False Claims Acts
ingly" to conform to the draft House bill, which ultimately was
signed into law, with the proviso affixed that "no proof of spe-
cific intent is required. ' 70 In explaining the scope of the amend-
ment, the Senate sponsor clarified the issue.
The fundamental issue in designing a standard of knowledge
is to reach not only defendants with actual knowledge of a
false claim, but also defendants who insulate themselves from
that knowledge which a prudent person should have before
submitting a claim to the Government. It is this problem of
defining constructive knowledge, or of dealing with the "os-
trich"-the individual who ignores or fails to inquire about
readily discoverable facts which would alert him that fraudu-
lent claims are being submitted-that has led to various for-
mulations of the standard of knowledge.
Our intent in returning to the reckless disregard standard is
only to assure that mere negligence, mistake, and inadvertence
are not actionable under the False Claims Act. In doing so, we
reconfirm our belief that reckless disregard and gross negli-
gence define essentially the same conduct and that under this
act, reckless disregard does not require any proof of an inten-
tional, deliberate, or willful act.7 '
House and Senate negotiators met to resolve pending differ-
ences in the bills passed by both bodies. These negotiators
adopted the Senate's definition of "knowing" and "know-
ingly. '72 In summarizing the statutory mandate, the House's
70. See 132 CONG. REC. S11238 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Simpson).
71. Id. at S11243 (statement of Sen. Grassley). Senator Grassley elaborated on
the Senate's choice of language to define the Act's intent standard:
S. 1562, as considered by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, contained a "reckless disregard" standard which the sponsors as
well as the Department of Justice believed would cover those persons who
insulate themselves by design from knowledge about the truth or falsity of a
claim. The concern was raised, however, that some case law exists in which
reckless disregard is construed as requiring an intentional, deliberate or will-
ful act-a considerable escalation of the scienter requirement. To avoid the
risk of such a misconstruction, the full Judiciary Committee then adopted a
"gross negligence" standard which would appear to be less susceptible to this
misinterpretation. The committee was aware that the two standards are very
similar and in fact are often used to define each other, that is, reckless disre-
gard often is defined as gross negligence and gross negligence frequently is
said to require a reckless disregard.
Id.
72. 132 CONG. REC. S15018 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stevens (for
Sen. Grassley)). The only difference existing at this time in the respective bodies'
definitions of "knowledge" was that the Senate's bill included the phrase "and no
proof of specific intent to defraud is required."
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chief sponsor, Representative Berman, pointed out that "[t]his
section is intended to reach the 'ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-
sand' problem where government contractors hide behind the
fact they were not personally aware that such overcharges may
have occurred. 7 3
B. Case Law Construing the FCA's Intent Requirement Since
the 1986 Amendments
Consistent with the legislative history and the plain language
of the FCA, courts have construed the statute to reach instances
in which the defendant did not act with a specific intent to de-
fraud the government. In other words, they did not specifically
know that the information on the face of the claim was false, but
instead were merely reckless or deliberately ignorant of the
facts. For example, in United States v. Lorenzo,74 the district
court imposed liability on the defendant based upon conduct
that the district court found constituted, at a minimum, "reckless
disregard" of the facts. Specifically, defendant dentist Dr. Lo-
renzo claimed to rely upon information he had learned at a sem-
inar and from a carrier representative leading him to believe
that he and his associated companies could bill Medicare for
oral cancer examinations provided to nursing home residents.
The court found that the governing statute and regulations
clearly did not permit Dr. Lorenzo and his companies to bill for
these services. Further, the court concluded that the carrier rep-
resentative had furnished Dr. Lorenzo incomplete information
because Dr. Lorenzo had failed to disclose to the representative
that the attending physicians had not requested the oral cancer
examinations and that the examinations were unrelated to spe-
cific medical problems.75
According to the court, Dr. Lorenzo received, but ignored,
information that should have put him on notice that his claims
were improper. Several employee dentists as well as the medi-
cal director of a group of nursing homes had challenged Dr. Lo-
renzo's right to bill Medicare for the oral cancer examinations.
Additionally, one carrier routinely had denied the claims that he
had submitted. Under these facts, the court determined that
although Dr. Lorenzo denied that he knew that the claims were
improperly coded, at the very least he "acted in reckless disre-
73. 132 CONG. REC. H9382, 9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986).
74. 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
75. Id. at 1129-30.
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gard of the truth or falsity of the information. '76 Thus, under
the FCA, the court found Dr. Lorenzo liable for $130,719.10 in
damages, trebled to $392,157.30, and $18,415,000 in civil
penalties.77
United States v. Krizek78 also presents a situation where no
direct proof of specific intent to violate the statute existed, yet
the court imposed liability under the FCA. In Krizek, the court
found that a physician had submitted claims recklessly when his
billing staff used "rough approximations" of his time with pa-
tients and submitted claims without supervision. Specifically,
the district court found that the staff assumed that the doctor
had furnished a fifty-minute psychotherapy session unless they
were told otherwise.79 Such an approximation resulted in the
physician's ability to bill for more than twenty hours of services
within a twenty-four hour period. While the physician claimed
that he was, at worst, merely "negligent" and emphasized the
"ma and pa" nature of his small practice, the court nonetheless
imposed liability, ruling that the physician "failed utterly in su-
pervising [his] agents in their submissions of claims on his behalf
... [furthermore] [t]hese were not 'mistakes' nor merely negli-
gent conduct." 8 The circuit court agreed, holding that the facts
supported the district court's finding that Dr. Krizek "acted with
reckless disregard. '81
Both the Lorenzo and Krizek cases demonstrate that courts
apply the FCA in situations where defendants have no direct
knowledge that their conduct is unlawful or wrongful. Thus, the
scope of the FCA is substantially broader than that of the Anti-
Kickback Act. Indeed, according to some of its legislative spon-
76. Id. at 1131-32. Apparently, Dr. Lorenzo also was aware the claims were false
because he "advised his patients to write their Congressmen to urge Medicare cover-
age for dental services... ." Id. at 1131.
77. I. at 1133.
78. 111 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
79. 859 F. Supp. 5, 11 (D.D.C. 1994), modified, 909 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1995),
rev'd in part, affd in part, and remanded, 111 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The 50-
minute session was the longest time-period the government reimbursed. Id. at 9. The
physician's staff believed that the 50-minute session served as a "rough approxima-
tion" because while some sessions were for a shorter duration (and thus a 20- to 30-
minute session code or some other code would be appropriate), some sessions were
for a substantially longer period than 50 minutes and yet only the 50-minute code
would be billed. Id. at 11.
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. 111 F.3d at 942. The District of Columbia Circuit Court explained the intent
standard to be applied to FCA actions. Id. at 941-42. Specifically, the court con-
cluded that "the best reading of the Act defines reckless disregard as an extension of
gross negligence." Id. at 942.
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sors, the FCA imposes liability on persons who are merely in a
position to obtain knowledge, but ignore "red flags" (the "os-
trich" situation); imposes liability on persons who do not have
actual knowledge of the transaction; and creates an "affirmative
obligation" on persons to "ascertain the truthfulness" of claims
for reimbursement submitted to the government 2
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S MISTAKEN ATTEMPT TO
PREDICATE AN FCA ACTION ON A VIOLATION OF
THE ANTI-KICKBACK ACT
The government's foray into combining the FCA with the
prohibitions of the Anti-Kickback Act is of recent vintage. As
noted in the Introduction, the DOJ settled cases with National
Medical Enterprises and Caremark based on allegations that
these companies violated both statutes, but both of these cases
involved parallel criminal and civil investigations.
Further, recently relators and the United States Attorney's of-
fices in some districts have litigated the issue.83 In 1994, in a
whistle-blower action in which the government did not inter-
vene, the district court denied a motion to dismiss an FCA ac-
tion based upon violations of the Anti-Kickback Act, although
the court questioned the relator's ability to prove the FCA vio-
lation.84 In Shalala v. 72 Medical, Inc. ,85 the government simul-
taneously filed a complaint and settled the action in which it
alleged that because the defendant had violated the Anti-Kick-
back Act, the defendant also had "caused false and fraudulent
claims to be presented to the United States in violation of 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)."86 It was unclear whether the government had
asserted, in fact, that it may predicate a civil FCA action upon a
violation of the Anti-Kickback Act or whether the criminal in-
vestigation had unearthed alleged violations of the Anti-Kick-
82. See 132 CONG. REc. at H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Berman). For a more detailed account of the history and application of the Act's
scienter standard, see Robert Salcido, Applications of the False Claims Act "Knowl-
edge" Standard- What One Must "Know" to be Held Liable Under the Act, THE
HEALTH LAWYER (ABA Forum on Health Law) (Mid-Wimter 1996).
83. In 1991, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed the government to pur-
sue its FCA claim based upon an alleged kickback scheme, denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss. United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
84. United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
85. Ga. No.1:94-CV-2549 (N.D. Ga. complaint filed Sept. 26, 1994).
86. Id. See also Novel Use of False Claims Act Arises in T2 Medicare Settlement, 3
BNA's HEALTH L. REP. 1418 (Oct. 20, 1994).
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back Act while the civil investigation had uncovered allegations
of unrelated violations of the FCA.
In 1996, the courts had the opportunity to rule on the issue.
District courts in United States ex rel. Pogue v. American
Healthcorp, Inc.,8T and United States ex rel. Thompson v. Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp. 8 split on the issue of whether a per-
son may predicate a violation of the FCA upon a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Act. Both of these actions were qui tam actions
in which the Department of Justice had declined to intervene.
Thus, these cases did not shed light on the DOJ's official view
on this matter.89 However, the DOJ unambiguously answered
this question during the summer of 1996, when, in United States
ex rel. Parker v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., it intervened in a
whistle-blower action, alleging that defendants had violated the
FCA based upon an alleged violation of the Anti-Kickback
Act.90
The remainder of this article reviews the opinions in Pogue
and Columbia/HCA, as well as the DOJ's litigating position in
Apria. Although the district court in Columbia/HCA correctly
rejected the whistle blower's contention that a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Act results in a violation of the FCA, the court
based its decision on the plaintiffs failure to meet pleading re-
quirements under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and on the plaintiff's failure to show that the claims filed
were in and of themselves fraudulent. 91 An alternative and
more fundamental basis exists to reach the same correct result.
Courts should conclude that the government (and private per-
sons acting under the FCA's qui tam provisions) cannot base an
FCA action upon an alleged violation of the Anti-Kickback Act
because such an action creates a conflict between the intent
standards under the two statutes. Given this conflict, courts
87. 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
88. 938 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
89. Although the United States Attorney's offices of various districts had predi-
cated FCA prosecutions upon an alleged violation of the Anti-Kickback Act, the
DOJ's Civil Division had not actively participated in those actions. This is significant
because primary power to enforce the FCA resides with the Civil Division, and the
government's general expertise with the statute resides in that office as well. See 28
C.F.R. pt. 0, subpt. Y, app. (1996). Thus, the Civil Division's intervention in a qui tam
action alleging such a theory, or bringing an action in its own name, is significant
because it signals that that office has approved the theory and will bring similar en-
forcement actions nationwide when it confronts similar facts.
90. United States ex reL Parker v. Apria Healthcare Group, Inc., No.1:95-CV-
2142-FMH (N.D. Ga. amended complaint filed July 10, 1996).
91. 938 F. Supp. at 406-07.
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should recognize that the Anti-Kickback Act is the more spe-
cific statute and that Congress intended it to provide the exclu-
sive remedy for an illegal kickback, thus denying litigants the
chance to employ the FCA.
A. FCA Actions Based Upon a Violation of the
Anti-Kickback Act
In Pogue, for the first time, a district court undertook an ex-
tended analysis of whether a person may allege a violation of
the FCA upon alleging a violation of the Anti-Kickback Act.
Pogue, the relator, had asserted that defendants "were involved
in a scheme by which individual physicians would refer their
Medicare and Medicaid patients" to a health care facility for
treatment in violation of the Anti-Kickback Act.92 The district
court initially granted defendant's motion to dismiss the FCA
claim on two grounds: "Pogue had failed to allege that any of
the claims submitted by [the defendant] were themselves false
S. . [and he] had failed to allege that the government suffered
damages as a result of the submission of the claims. '9 3 The rela-
tor moved for reconsideration. Specifically, as to the ruling that
the claims were not false, the relator contended that participants
in any federal program impliedly certify "that the participant
will abide by and adhere to all statutes, rules, and regulations
governing that program .... [Therefore,] by submitting a claim
for payment without complying with such statutes, rules and
regulations, Defendants had submitted a fraudulent claim in vio-
lation of the FCA."94
The district court attempted to stake out a middle ground be-
tween a wholesale adoption of the relator's theory and a rejec-
tion of the contention that an alleged violation of the Anti-
Kickback Act can form the basis for a violation of the FCA.
First, it noted that one other district court had ruled that an al-
leged violation of the Anti-Kickback Act could form the basis
92. 914 F. Supp. at 1508.
93. United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., No. 3-94-0515, 1995
WL 626514, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1995).
94. 914 F. Supp. at 1509. The district court reversed its prior ruling that a relator
must allege that the government suffered damages in order to state a cause of action
under the FCA. It pointed out that the Supreme Court in Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537 (1943), had affirmed, without discussion, a district court ruling that a failure to
show actual damages would not prove fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action under the
FCA. 914 F. Supp. at 1509 n.1.
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for a violation of the FCA.95 The court also pointed out that a
body of FCA case law had broadly construed the statute to
reach instances where a violation of the FCA was based upon a
violation of another statute.96 Finally, the court pointed to the
legislative history of the FCA, which stated that "'each and
every claim submitted.., in violation of any statute or applica-
ble regulation, constitutes a false claim.'-97 The court concluded
that Congress did not intend to limit the FCA to claims that are
fraudulent on their face, but to include "fraudulent acts that
cause the government to pay out sums of money to claimants it
did not intend to benefit."98
If the district court had completed its analysis at this point,
the case would have been a complete victory for the relator.
However, the court cautioned that the FCA did not reach all
fraud to which the government is exposed.99 The court also
pointed out that several other courts had in fact refused to apply
95. 914 F. Supp. at 1509 (citing United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D. Ohio 1994)). The district court in Roy ruled that plaintiff's "vague asser-
tion" that defendants "were engaged in continuing violations of the Fraud & Abuse
Statute during-and in connection with-their submission of claims for Medicare/
Medicaid payments" created "a tenuous connection between the Fraud & Abuse Stat-
ute and the False Claims Act, but the connection is sufficient to overcome the burden
of a [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) motion." Roy, 914 F. Supp. at 1506.
96. Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1510-11 (citing Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., v. United States,
31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and United States v. Incor-
porated Village of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
In Ab-Tech, the plaintiff had obtained a Small Business Administration contract
based upon its representation that it would adhere to program requirements that it
would obtain advance approval of financial arrangements it had entered into with
non-minority firms. The court ruled that although the claims were not false-the
work had been performed-the claims were rendered false by plaintiffs failure to
abide by the rules underlying the program. In Island Park, the court had found that
defendants had engaged in a pre-selection scheme under which it gave preferential
treatment to resident white applicants for housing in violation of regulations applica-
ble to the grant funds it received. Further, the court found that the defendants, in
obtaining the grant funds, falsely stated that persons would not be excluded from the
program on the basis of race. From these facts it concluded that defendants had vio-
lated the False Claims Act by engaging in fraudulent conduct and making false state-
ments that caused false claims for HUD-subsidized mortgages to be submitted to the
government.
See also Ryan, supra note 7, at 144.
97. 914 F. Supp. at 1513, quoting S. REP. 99-345, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5274. The court continued: "'[Claims may be false even though the services
are provided as claimed if, for example, the claimant is ineligible to participate in the
program, or though payments on the Government loan are current, if by means of
false statements the Government was induced to lend an inflated amount."' Id. at
1511 (quoting S. REP. 99-345, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274).
98. 914 F. Supp. at 1513 (emphasis added).
99. 914 F. Supp. at 1508 (citing United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958)).
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the FCA in particular situations even though the defendant had
engaged in fraudulent conduct.100 In its attempt to reconcile the
case law, the court first concluded that Congress intended to re-
duce financial loss to the government, either through patently
false claims or claims that "cause the government to pay out
sums of money to claimants it did not intend to benefit."''1 1
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the FCA did not "oper-
ate as a stalking horse for enforcement of every statute, rule, or
regulation" nor "punish every type of fraud committed upon the
government.' 01 2 Thus, the court concluded that a relator may
bring his claim under the FCA "only if he can show that De-
fendants engaged in the fraudulent conduct with the purpose of
inducing payment from the government.' 01 3 Because the Pogue
court found that the relator had in fact alleged "that Defendants
concealed their illegal activities from the government in an ef-
fort to defraud the government into paying Medicare claims it
would not have otherwise paid," he had stated a cause of action
under the FCA.1 4
In Columbia/HCA, the district court arrived at a different
conclusion. In this case, the relator contended that the defend-
ants had created investment arrangements and provided finan-
cial inducements to physicians for patient referrals in violation
of the Medicare Anti-Kickback Act and Stark laws, which, the
relator contended, resulted in a violation of the FCA.10 5 The
100. 914 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (citing United States v. Shaw, 725 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.
Miss. 1989) and United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax, 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.
1997)). In Shaw, the district court rejected the government's contention that the use
of a bribe to influence loan approval rendered the application for the loan false or
fraudulent. In Weinberger, the Fifth Circuit held that even if plaintiff had properly
alleged facts constituting a violation of the Anti-Pinkerton Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3108
(1995), which prohibits the government from employing an individual employed by a
detective agency or similar organization, he had failed to state a claim under the FCA.
The court stated: "Unless the government made it clear that it would not employ
detective agencies when it contracted for the work, [the defendant's] application did
not make a material misrepresentation, did not mislead the government, and thus did
not defraud the government within the meaning of the False Claims Act." 557 F.2d at
461.
101. 914 F. Supp. at 1513.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. See also Kristen DeBry et al., Health Care Fraud, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
815 (1996); Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
589 (1996) (further discussing health care industry fraud against the government).
105. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 938 F.
Supp. 399, 401 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Stark I prohibited doctors from referring Medicare
patients to an entity for clinical laboratory services if the referring doctor had a non-
exempt financial relationship with such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1995). Stark II
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defendants contended that the court should dismiss the relator's
claim because the law of the Fifth Circuit prohibited an FCA
action if the government did not pay out more on a claim than it
would have paid but for the alleged fraud.1°6 The district court
concurred with the defendants, holding that the Fifth Circuit still
required "that a claim itself be false or fraudulent in order for
liability under the FCA to exist .... Allegations that medical
services were rendered in violation of Medicare anti-fraud stat-
utes do not, by themselves, state a claim for relief under the
FCA.,10
7
While the Apria case recently settled, the arguments made by
the DOJ and defendants during the course of the litigation are
instructive. In United States ex rel. Parker v. Apria Healthcare
Group, Inc.,108 the DOJ intervened in a qui tam action and
amended the whistle blower's complaint to allege that Apria en-
tered into a "consultant" agreement with defendants Georgia
Lung Associates ("GLA") and Dr. Swartz, the "primary pur-
pose" of which was to secure "patient referrals."'1 9 The govern-
ment contended that Apria paid GLA an amount that exceeded
the fair market value of any consulting services provided. Apria
immediately filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the govern-
ment could not base an FCA action upon a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Act. Defendant pointed out that the underlying
claims were truthful and, therefore, could not form the basis of
an FCA action; that the FCA is not intended to be a "catchall"
remedy for every type of alleged fraud against the government;
and that the Anti-Kickback Act is a criminal statute with no
provision for civil enforcement.110
The government, in opposing Apria's motion to dismiss, set
forth three grounds upon which it believed its claim should sur-
vive."' First, it contended that the FCA reaches not just "false"
expanded the scope of "designated health services" for which referrals are prohibited.
Id § 1395nn(a)(1).
106. 938 F. Supp. at 403 (citing for support United States ex rel. Weinberger v.
Equifax, 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Shaw, 725 F. Supp. 896
(S.D. Miss. 1989)).
107. Id. at 405.
108. No. 1:95-CV-2142-FMH (N.D. Ga. amended complaint filed July 10, 1996).
109. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Defendant Apria Healthcare
Group, Inc. to Dismiss Complaint and Amended Complaint, at 4, Apria (No. 1:95-
CV-2142-FMH) (memorandum filed July 25, 1996). The case was settled before the
court ruled on the motion to dismiss.
110. Id. at 4-14.
111. Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Apria Healthcare
Group, Inc., Georgia Lung Associates, P.C. and Edward I. Swartz's Motions to Dis-
1997]
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claims but all "fraudulent" attempts to obtain governmental
funds. Second, it asserted that the defendants' actions were
"fraudulent" because, contrary to their representations in pro-
vider agreements to abide by all program requirements, they
had entered into a kickback scheme that violated the Anti-Kick-
back Act, thereby rendering their underlying Medicare claims
false. Third, the government, relying primary upon the analysis
contained in Pogue, argued that a number of cases as well as the
FCA's legislative history supported the conclusion that an FCA
action may be based upon the violation of another statute.112
Thus, there is no definitive resolution of the issue. As sug-
gested below, the resolution that best conforms with the struc-
ture and policy of the Anti-Kickback Act is that an FCA action
cannot be based upon an alleged violation of the Anti-Kickback
Act because the two statutes, when applied together, conflict.
B. The Conflicts and Ill Effects of Using the False Claims Act
to Prosecute Kickback Schemes
Courts should reject attempts to base FCA actions upon a vio-
lation of the Anti-Kickback Act for four reasons. First, the in-
tent standards in the two statutes are in conflict. Second, the
legislative histories of both acts reveal no intent on the part of
Congress to use both to combat kickbacks in the health care
industry. Third, Congress intended that the Anti-Kickback Act
be the government's exclusive remedy when persons knowingly
and willfully solicit or receive remuneration in exchange for the
referral of program-related business. Last, these actions could
have a chilling effect on beneficial changes occurring in the
health care industry.
There is a conflict between the Anti-Kickback Act and the
FCA when the government proposes to establish a violation of
the FCA based upon a violation of the Anti-Kickback Act in a
civil proceeding. Under the plain language of the FCA, the gov-
ernment need only prove that defendant acted with "reckless
disregard" or "deliberate ignorance" of the facts in order to es-
tablish a violation of the FCA." 3 The Anti-Kickback Act, how-
miss the United States' Amended Complaint, Apria (No. 1:95-CV-2142-FMH) (mem-
orandum filed Aug. 22, 1996).
112. Id. at 14-16.
113. As was noted above, the Senate's chief sponsor of the amendments to the
FCA pointed out that the Act does not require "proof of specific intent." 132 CONG.
REc. S11238 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Further, in the
House, Rep. Berman stated that the FCA may apply "where the submitted claims to
130 [Vol. 6
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ever, mandates that the defendant "knowingly and willfully"
engage in the prohibited conduct. Inevitably, when the govern-
ment attempts to apply the lower intent standard to an illegal
referral by alleging a violation of the FCA, a conflict is created.
There will be a category of cases in which the defendant acted
with recklessness or in deliberate ignorance of known facts but
did not act "knowingly and willfully." To the extent the govern-
ment attempts to penalize these individuals for illegal referrals,
courts should dismiss the action.
The cases previously discussed underscore the type of conflict
that may arise. As was noted, in Lorenzo and in Krizek the de-
fendants claimed that they did not "know" that the claims they
submitted were false claims. In these cases, the courts imposed
liability because, under the circumstances, the defendants were
"reckless" (the FCA standard) in not determining whether the
factual basis of their claims was accurate. Conversely, as ex-
plained in section I(F) above, under the Anti-Kickback Act, de-
fendants at a minimum must have actual knowledge that their
conduct was improper. Recall that the Ninth Circuit held in
Hanlester that defendants must know they have violated the law;
their belief that their arrangements were lawful then provides a
defense to the allegations. The Eighth Circuit in Jain held that
the defendant must know his conduct is wrongful. If either
court had applied the FCA intent standard, and thereby limited
its analysis to whether the litigants were reckless in entering into
the questioned arrangement, the analysis would have been sub-
stantially different, and, in the Hanlester case, the result may
have been different as well.
When the Supreme Court has confronted situations in which
two statutes may be applied but conflict in their application, it
applies the more specific. "Where there is not clear intention
otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by
a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. 11 4 In the
context of the Anti-Kickback Act, the specific resolution was to
design a statute requiring a specific intent provision with a dual
enforcement scheme, which permitted criminal prosecution or
administrative enforcement. There was no clear intention to
otherwise sanction an illegal kickback using the already avail-
the Government are prepared in such a sloppy or unsupervised fashion" that it "re-
sult[s] in overcharges to the Government." 132 CONG. REC. H9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1986).
114. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
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able FCA. Therefore, where an application of the Anti-Kick-
back Act conflicts with the FCA, the specific provisions of the
Anti-Kickback Act govern and provide the government with a
means of relief.115 Courts should refrain from reading the Anti-
Kickback Act into the FCA because the histories of both the
Anti-Kickback Act and the FCA demonstrate that Congress did
not intend these statutes to be used in concert.
As explained in Section I, Congress has amended the Anti-
Kickback Act at least four times to clarify and narrow its appli-
cation to only those who "knowingly and willfully" engage in
prohibited conduct. To assure compliance, Congress directed
the Secretary of HIHS to specify practices that were so inher-
ently innocuous that they would not be subjected to prosecu-
tion. Most recently, Congress directed the Secretary to furnish
the health care community with advisory opinions and, when ap-
propriate, additional safe harbors and fraud alerts. The clearly
stated goal was to avoid any chilling effect the Act might have
on legitimate arrangements. To expand the otherwise clear
boundaries of unacceptable practice and broaden them under
the FCA flies in the face of congressional actions. Under these
circumstances, not only will the most "deliberate cases" of a vio-
lation of the law be prosecuted either by the DOJ or whistle
blowers, but so too will fringe cases. In direct contradiction to
congressional intent, such an enforcement policy could easily
have a "chilling effect" on legitimate transactions and impede
"providers who are attempting to structure new and innovative
health care delivery systems to contain health care cost."116
Congress's goals in amending the FCA likewise could be un-
dermined. Congress specifically set forth the standard of intent
applied in FCA actions-reckless disregard or deliberate igno-
rance. However, the government may only establish a violation
of the Anti-Kickback Act by proving that the person acted with
specific intent to violate the law, the explicit standard that Con-
gress had rejected under the FCA but had embraced under the
Anti-Kickback Act. The result would be two tracks in FCA liti-
gation-litigation where the court must apply the intent stan-
dard of the FCA and a second set of prosecutions where the
115. See also McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1996) ("When
Congress crafts particular remedies for particular wrongs, the presumption is that
these are the exclusive remedies and that such limitations as they may embody are not
to be circumvented by extending a more generally worded statute over the subject of
the more specific one.") (citations omitted).
116. Id.
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court must ignore the FCA intent standard and apply an intent
standard of another statute, the Anti-Kickback Act. This result
is contrary to Congress's intent that the FCA provide a "uni-
form" scienter standard to be applied in all FCA prosecutions. 117
The second issue is perhaps the most troubling: the expansion
of exclusive remedies. The Supreme Court has ruled that where
it is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended one
statute to provide an exclusive remedy, that statute must be ap-
plied even where the terms of another statute may operate. 18
Amendments to and debates on the Anti-Kickback Act, such as
the imposition of an intent standard, clarification as to its appli-
cation, and establishment of a dual (criminal and administrative)
enforcement process, manifest the intent to fill the field in this
area and establish an exclusive remedy under the Anti-Kickback
Act. While courts have applied the FCA to violations of other
statutes, 119 the key distinction is that the other statutes did not
on their face encompass possibly innocent conduct. 20 For ex-
ample, violations of the environmental laws, the Fair Housing
Act, and the General Anti-Kickback Act are equally actionable
whether the action is brought under those statutes or under the
FCA because innocent conduct is not included within the con-
fines of these statutes. To the contrary, as the Eighth Circuit
pointed out in United States v. Jain, the Anti-Kickback Act may
117. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271-72.
118. See, e.g., Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1976) (find-
ing that Congress intended "to create an exclusive preemptive administrative and ju-
dicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination"); see also Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 734 (1989) ("precisely drawn, detailed statute
pre-empts more general remedies").
119. See, e.g., United States v. Accudyne Corp., 880 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Wis. 1995)
(holding that the FCA was not preempted by environmental laws, such as the Clean
Water Act, when the relator had contended a violation of the FCA predicated upon a
violation of the environmental laws). See also United States v. Incorporated Village
of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that the FCA was not
preempted by the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") when the government had asserted
claims under the FCA rather than under the FHA).
120. The General Anti-Kickback Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (1995), generally prohib-
its the payment of compensation by a subcontractor to a prime contractor for the
purpose of improperly obtaining favorable treatment in connection with a prime con-
tract. Unlike the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Kickback Act, it expressly permits the gov-
ernment to institute a civil cause of action based upon a demonstration that defendant
"knowingly engages in conduct prohibited" by the law. Id. § 55. Thus, unlike the
situation with the Anti-Kickback Act, there is no conflict between the General Anti-
Kickback Act and the FCA because both statutes provide for civil relief upon a show-
ing that the defendant "knowingly" violated the law. Under these circumstances, the
rule permitting plaintiff to chose the remedies prevails because there is no conflict
between statutes.
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encompass within its broad sweep innocent conduct.121 In addi-
tion, Congress has created statutory exceptions to the Anti-
Kickback Act and now has mandated the Secretary to provide
even more safe harbors, thereby protecting from Anti-Kickback
Act sanctions what the government perceives as innocent con-
duct.122 Additionally, if a party brings an action for a prohibited
kickback under the FCA, with its lesser intent standard, there is
a substantial risk that innocent persons would be prosecuted
since, in the eyes of Congress, only those who "knowingly and
willfully" pay or solicit remuneration are culpable under the
Anti-Kickback Act.
Finally, courts should consider the policy implications of ap-
plying the FCA to activities proscribed by the Anti-Kickback
Act. As has been well documented, the transformations occur-
ring within the health care industry have required increased co-
ordination of resources. Further, those compensated under
capitation systems may be subject to guidelines regarding refer-
rals that seek to reduce or eliminate unnecessary medical serv-
ices. The necessity of such interconnectedness and adherence to
such guidelines require exchanges that include the payment of
remuneration, found acceptable under a safe harbor or statutory
exception. An overly broad interpretation of the Anti-Kickback
Act could have a chilling effect on cost-saving measures that
could enhance patient care.123
Certainly, the use of the FCA to enforce another law is not
unusual. What are unusual are the results explained above,
which are not supported by the purposes or goals of the FCA
and not supported by Congress's response to illegal kickbacks.
121. 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996).
122. For example, the safe harbors to date have touched upon investment interest,
rental fees for space and equipment, contracts for personal services and management,
the sale of a practice, the use of referral agencies and services, warranties, discounts,
payments to employees, payments to group purchasing organizations, issues facing
health care providers and the home health industry, and services to residents at nurs-
ing facilities. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1996).
123. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective
Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLuM. L. Rnv. 1861
(1989) (asserting that "[i]t is preposterous to attempt to prevent payments among
health care providers, at least in an economic milieu that relies upon private behavior
motivated by the promise of profit"). See also Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, The Medi-
care Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act-Is Ignorance of the Law an
Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CAT. U. L. REv. 943
(1996); John J. Farley, Note, The Medicare Antifraud Statute and Safe Harbor Regula-
tions: Suggestions for Change, 81 GEO. L.J. 167 (1992).
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CONCLUSION
The general FCA and the broadly worded Anti-Kickback Act
provide the federal government with substantial power over any
person who desires to furnish care to Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries. However, both statutes were designed to address
different concerns and problems. The government's attempt to
mix the statutes results in an unwarranted dilution of the Anti-
Kickback Act's intent standard, transforms a criminal law stat-
ute into a civil statute, imposes possibly enormous penalties, and
converts a statute that does not provide for private relief into
one that permits private causes of action. There is no evidence
that Congress intended any of these results. Given this, courts
should refuse to allow the government and whistle blowers to
base their FCA actions upon an alleged violation of the Anti-
Kickback Act.
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